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INTRODUCTION
For many years, legal scholars and political scientists have studied domestic public law
and international public law as separate subjects, treating them as if they were intrinsically
different phenomena.2 This approach is highly institutionalized in the legal and political science
academies.3 In law schools there are, of course, separate courses and casebooks for international
public law on the one hand, and domestic public law topics such as administrative law and
constitutional law on the other hand. In political science departments, to the extent law is taught
at all, domestic public law is usually taught by American politics scholars,4 and international
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Black’s Law Dictionary defines public law as “[a] general classification of law, consisting generally of
constitutional, administrative, criminal, and international law, concerned with the organization of the state, the
relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers to the state, to each
other, and to private persons, and the relations of states to one another.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1106 (5th ed.
1979). Similarly, according to one leading public law scholar, “[p]ublic law governs the internal processes of
government bodies and their relations to one another and to the citizens.” Martin Shapiro, Public Law and Judicial
Politics, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE II 365, 366 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993). The
argument I make in this article is meant to apply to those aspects of public law, whether domestic or international,
which prescribe appropriate government behavior. Although it might be possible to extend my argument further, I
do not attempt to do so here.
3
According to Brierly,
The recognition of international law as a separate object of study dates from the latter part of the sixteenth
century. Earlier writers had written on some of the topics which fall within modern international law,
especially on the usages of war and on the treatment of ambassadors; but they did not separate the legal
from the theological and ethical, or the domestic from the international aspects of such questions.
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 25 (6th ed. 1963). But see FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND
DECISIONS 5 (1989) for a different interpretation:
None of the original founders of the ‘law of, and among nations’ (ius gentium, ius inter gentes) limited his
investigation to narrow legal issues in international life, and for good reasons. From Grotius to Vattel and
Triepel, treatises on international law were always inquiries about law in general, and they concerned a
wide variety of historical, political, and philosophical issues. (internal citations omitted).
More recently, Martin Shapiro noted that although the “public law” subfield of political science included not only
constitutional and administrative law, but also international law, during one period lasting until the 1950s, even then
international law was considered a “distinct entity.” Shapiro, supra note 2, at 365. Both domestic and international
public law arguably have their roots in ancient times. The study of the questions underlying the current field of
domestic public law can be traced as far back as Plato’s The Republic and Aristotle’s The Politics, and rudimentary
forms of international public law emerged in ancient times among the Greek city-states. CHARLES G. FENWICK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (3rd ed. 1948).
4
See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 365. In some political science departments (e.g. Berkeley and Princeton), domestic
public law subjects like constitutional law, jurisprudence, and judicial politcs are studied and taught by a dedicated
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public law by international relations scholars. Academic journals in both law and political
science generally mirror this distinction between domestic and international public law.5
A traditional theoretical basis for this separate treatment has been what might be called
the “structural/functional distinction.”6 This distinction holds that domestic law is a hierarchical
system with centralized enforcement whose primary function is to constrain behavior, whereas
international law is an anarchic system relying on decentralized enforcement or self-help that
primarily performs functions other than constraint. An assumption, that hierarchy and
centralized enforcement are necessary for law to systematically constrain behavior, connects the
structural and functional elements of the distinction.
In this article, I reexamine the traditional approach and propose, as an alternative, a
unified concept of public law. I do so in four parts. First, I explain the structural/functional
distinction, giving examples from both law and political science. Second, I demonstrate the
distinction’s limitations. By drawing from recent international relations scholarship that
highlights structural variation both within international politics and across domestic political
systems, and by conceptually disaggregating the state, I attempt to highlight the weaknesses of
the domestic-international dichotomy upon which the structural/functional distinction is based. I
argue that the structural differences between domestic and international public law generally are
differences of degree, not kind. Moreover, I attempt to illustrate the theoretical problems posed

public law faculty. See, e.g., http://www.polisci.berkeley.edu/Grad/SubFields/Pub_Law.html and
http://web.princeton.edu/sites/politics/grad/gradfields.shtm.
5
In general political science journals, domestic public law articles are not infrequent, but international law articles
are rare. For example, Beth Simmons noted in 2001 that the words “international law” could be found in article
titles only five times this century, and only once since 1953, in the American Political Science Review. Beth
Simmons, International Law and International Relations: Scholarship at the Intersection of Principles and Politics,
2001 PROC. OF THE ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 271, 272. Instead, political science articles on
international law ordinarily are found in journals dedicated to international politics. General law journals appear to
be more open than their political science counterparts to articles on international law, but there are numerous law
journals that focus specifically on either domestic public law (e.g. constitutional law or administrative law) or
international public law.
6
Of course, there also are a variety of doctrinal differences between the two realms of public law that make their
separate study convenient. For example, the sources of domestic and international public law are different, the
former in constitutions and legislation, and the latter primarily in international treaties and international custom. See
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. I (5th ed. 1998) for a discussion of international custom
and other sources of international law. Moreover, the scope of government activity regulated by domestic public
law is primarily domestic, while that of international public law is primarily international. Note, however, that this
distinction has always been somewhat blurry, and is becoming increasingly so. Domestic public law includes rules
governing foreign relations, such as constitutional requirements for entering treaties and declaring war (see, e.g.,
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972)), and international public law includes rules that
apply to the domestic behavior of governments, such as human rights law. In addition, domestic public law is often
understood as primarily regulating relationships between individuals and the government, whereas international
public law mainly regulates relationships between governments. But this also is not a clean distinction. Domestic
public law can regulate relationships between governmental entities (for example, among executives, legislatures,
judiciaries and bureaucracies and, in federal systems, among states and between state and national governments),
and public international law is increasingly extending its reach to individuals (for example, in the area of human
rights). Although these differences provide a convenient basis for separating the study of public law into domestic
and international components, they do not provide a compelling theoretical justification for treating the two realms
of public law as fundamentally different.
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by the assumption that hierarchy and centralized enforcement are necessary for law to constrain
behavior systematically.
But highlighting the flaws of the structural/functional distinction is not enough to justify
a new approach; all useful concepts simplify certain aspects of reality. The question is whether
the theoretical advantages of a concept’s simplifications outweigh the disadvantages. I suggest
that in the case of the structural/functional distinction in public law, the answer is probably “no.”
My claim is that the traditional distinction, with its emphasis on hierarchy and centralized
enforcement, obscures other important variables and causal mechanisms relevant to the functions
of public law, and misleadingly suggests that the values of the relevant variables necessarily
depend on whether the public law system being studied is domestic or international.
In the third part of the article, I support this claim by surveying a variety of rational
choice oriented theories advanced by both scholars of domestic law and scholars of international
law who are asking essentially the same question: how can public law constrain government
behavior in the absence of hierarchy and centralized enforcement? Importantly, these scholars,
from different sides of the domestic-international divide, and from both law and political science,
are giving similar answers suggesting similar causal mechanisms, including reputation and
credibility, focal points and coordination, issue breadth and time horizon in interest calculations,
and norms and domestic politics. This theoretical convergence points to interesting possibilities
for interdisciplinary scholarship and suggests that public law may influence governments in
similar ways in the domestic and international realms.
This theoretical convergence leads me, in the fourth part of this article, to call on public
law scholars in both law and political science to think beyond the domestic-international divide.
To support this type of thinking, I propose a unified concept of public law as an alternative to the
traditional structural/functional distinction. I do so cautiously, heeding H. L. A. Hart’s warning
in The Concept of Law against succumbing to the temptation of treating domestic and
international public law as the same.7 If the problem with the traditional approach is that it
ignores important similarities between domestic and public international law, the risk of a unified
concept is that it might overlook relevant differences. With these cautions in mind, I argue that
public law scholars should explore the potential, as well as the limits, of a unified concept of
public law, and that doing so may yield important theoretical, pedagogical and policy benefits.

7

Hart notes that “some theorists, in their anxiety to defend against the skeptic the title of international law to be
called ‘law,’ have succumbed to the temptation to minimize these formal differences, and to exaggerate the
analogies which can be found in international law to legislation or other desirable formal features of municipal law.”
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 232 (2nd ed. 1994). In some cases, analogizing between domestic and
international politics may be counterproductive. See, e.g., Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, Accountability
and Abuses of Power in World Politics 2 (March 16, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.poli.duke.edu/people/faculty/keohane.html) (criticizing the analogy of domestic democratic
accountability as a basis for designing accountability mechanisms in world politics). Laurence Helfer’s thoughtprovoking recent article on constitutional analogies to international law is reason for optimism that heeding such
warnings is not incompatible with productive thinking across the domestic-international divide. Laurence R. Helfer,
Constitutional Analogies in the International Legal System, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193 (2003). In it, he acknowledges
the risks of analogizing, id. at 198, but carefully navigates around them to produce interesting insights that would
have been unlikely if he had strictly adhered to the traditional structural/functional distinction.
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To be clear about the scope of my argument, I do not make any empirical claims in this
article about the relative efficacy of domestic and international public law.8 My argument is
about how, not how much, public law may influence government behavior. Nor do I attempt to
contribute to either side of the monist-dualist debate,9 or to current debates regarding the extent
to which domestic courts should apply international law.10 My argument is not that domestic
public law and international public law are, or should be conceived as, a single system, but rather
that the two realms of public law may operate in similar ways. Finally, I do not directly address
ongoing scholarly discussions regarding the continued vitality of the private-public distinction in
law and politics.11 Those discussions are important, but as long as governments continue to be
among the most powerful actors in domestic and world politics, I believe it will also be
important to devote focused scholarly attention to systems like public law that might help
mitigate the problem of abuses of public power.

I. THE STRUCTURAL/FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTION
A principal theoretical justification for the separate study of domestic and international
public law has been the traditional structural/functional distinction. As noted above, this
distinction holds that domestic law is a hierarchical system with centralized enforcement whose
primary function is to constrain behavior, and international law is an anarchic system relying on
decentralized enforcement or self-help that primarily performs functions other than constraint.
The structural component of the distinction can be traced to the nineteenth century legal
positivist John Austin. According to his “command theory of law,” law is the command of a
sovereign backed by sanctions.12 In domestic legal systems, the government issues commands
and applies sanctions for violating them. In the international legal system, however, there is no
8

For an overview of contending theories and empirical findings about the causal impact of international law, see Kal
Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
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In one version of this debate, monists argue that domestic and international law are part of a single legal system in
which international law is supreme, and dualists reject this claim, insisting that domestic and international public
law are separate systems. For more detailed discussions of monism and dualism, see LOUIS HENKIN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 140-141 (2nd ed. 1987), MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
100-102 (4th ed.1997), and BROWNLIE, supra note 6, at 31-32.
10
For different takes on the question of international law in domestic courts, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley,
The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998); Lea Brilmayer, International Law in
American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277 (1991); A. Mark Weisburd, American Judges and
International Law, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1475 (2003).
11
See Shapiro, supra note 2, at 366 for a brief summary of some of the ways the private-public distinction has been
challenged. Examples of work questioning or reassessing the private-public distinction include BARRY E. CARTER
& PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2 (1991), Robert Post, Constitutional Law: The Challenge of
Globalization to American Public Law Scholarship 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 323-325 (2001), and Alfred
C. Aman, Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance,
8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379 (2001). Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet’s forthcoming work also
seems to imply that the private-public distinction is unnecessary. See Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet, Law,
Politics and International Governance, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Christian Reus-Smit ed.,
forthcoming) (manuscript available at http://hypatia.ss.uci.edu/ps/personnel/sandholtz/Papers.htm). Although it
might be possible to modify and extend my argument to include private law, I do not attempt to do so in this article.
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Brian Bix, John Austin, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2002) at
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/austin-john/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2004).
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sovereign to issue commands and back them with sanctions. “[H]ence,” Austin argues, “it
inevitably follows, that the law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive
law is set by a given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author.”13
Although Austin’s command theory has been challenged on many fronts, perhaps most famously
by the legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart,14 his emphasis on the distinction between domestic legal
systems with a sovereign able to impose sanctions and international legal systems lacking these
features has survived as a core element of the structural/functional distinction.
Political scientists have traditionally made the same structural distinction, albeit with less
concern for the debate over international law’s status as “positive” or “real” law. In the words of
Hedley Bull, a leading figure in the English school of international relations theory, “Whatever
the difficulties of the Austinian view, it does help to bring out the fact that international law,
whether or not it is ‘law’ properly so-called, differs from municipal law in one central respect:
whereas law within the modern state is backed up by the authority of a government, including its
power to use or threaten force, international law is without this kind of prop.”15 Leading realist
international relations theorists also make this distinction. For example, as Hans Morgenthau
argues, “Domestic law can be imposed by the group that holds the monopoly of organized force;
that is, the officials of the state. It is an essential characteristic of international society,
composed of sovereign states, which by definition are the supreme legal authorities within their
respective territories, that no such central lawgiving and law-enforcing authority can exist
there.”16
According to the traditional distinction, these intrinsic structural differences between
domestic and international legal systems have an important functional implication. The primary
function of domestic legal systems is to constrain behavior, a function made possible by
hierarchy and centralized enforcement. However, since the international legal system lacks these
features, it is forced to rely on decentralized enforcement through either individual or collective
self-help. Even if decentralized enforcement may, under certain circumstances, permit
international law to constrain behavior, it cannot do so systematically.
An assumption thus links the structural and functional elements of the traditional
distinction: that hierarchy and centralized enforcement are necessary for law to systematically
constrain behavior. For example, Morgenthau reasons that “[w]hen individual A violates the
rights of individual B within the national community, the law-enforcement agencies of this state
will intervene and protect B against A and compel A to give B satisfaction according to the law.
Nothing of this kind exists in the international sphere. . . . There can be no more primitive and no
weaker system of law enforcement than this; for it delivers the enforcement of the law to the
13

JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 177 (1861). Shaw summarizes a modern version
of this view as follows: “Virtually everybody who starts reading about international law does so having learned or
absorbed something about the principal characteristics of ordinary or domestic law. What are those identifying
marks? A recognized body to legislate or create laws, a hierarchy of courts with compulsory jurisdiction to settle
disputes over such laws and an accepted system of enforcing those laws. Without a legislature, judiciary and
executive, one cannot talk about a legal order. How can one accept a universal system of international law therefore
if this is the case?” SHAW, supra note 9, at 2-3.
14
HART, supra note 7.
15
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY 130 (3rd ed. 1977).
16
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 281-282 (5th ed. 1978).
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vicissitudes of the distribution of power between the violator of the law and the victim of the
violation. It makes it easy for the strong both to violate the law and to enforce it, and
consequently puts the rights of the weak in jeopardy. A great power can violate the rights of a
small nation without having to fear effective sanctions on the latter’s part.”17
Interestingly, the structural/functional distinction is widely accepted not only by
“skeptics” about international law’s influence on government behavior and its status as “real”
law, but also by “defenders” of international law.18 Skeptics define effective legal systems as
requiring certain characteristics (such as a sovereign to issue commands and sanction violations),
and then distinguish what they observe: domestic systems that possess these characteristics, and
an international system that does not. On that basis, skeptical legal philosophers have argued
that international law is not really law,19 and skeptical political scientists argue that international
law does not have an important independent influence on government behavior.20
In contrast, some defenders distinguish what observers should be looking for in the first
place: domestic legal systems that constrain behavior, and an international legal system that
performs other important functions. This allows them to accept the structural/functional
distinction, but resist the skeptics’ conclusions regarding the relevance of international law. In
what Raustiala and Slaughter call “the standard move,” defenders reason that “[e]nforcement
requires an enforcer, which the international system manifestly does not have. Law, however,
can and does perform many functions other than constraint.”21 For example, the policy-oriented
approach inspired by Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell sees law not simply as a limit on
power, but as a tool used to promote values. According to Richard Falk’s “world order”
approach, international law performs important international systemic functions such as
facilitating crisis communication and enabling cooperation. The “managerial school” of
international law, exemplified by the work of Abram and Antonia Chayes, argues that
international law affects the course of international affairs not only as a constraint, but also as a
basis of justification or legitimization for action and by providing organizational structures,
procedures and forums within which international political decisions may be reached.22
In summary, according to the traditional structural/functional distinction, domestic legal
systems are characterized by hierarchy and centralized enforcement and, because of these
features, they are able to perform a constraint function. Lacking these features, the international
legal system is unable to systematically perform that function, leading skeptics to deny an
important role for international law, and defenders to assert that international law performs
alternative, but nevertheless important, functions in world politics. The connection between the
17

Id. at 297-298.
The labels “skeptics” and “defenders” are not meant to carry normative implications. Indeed, I have refrained
from referring to “realists” and “idealists” (or “liberals”) not only because they do not always accurately describe the
participants in the debate, but also because they have become loaded terms that often serve as straw men.
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20
For overviews of the skeptical approach, see LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 22-25 (1979), Beth A.
Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 75, 79-80 (1998), and Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205,
207-209, 214-217 (1993).
21
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 8, at 540.
22
For an overview of these approaches, see Slaughter Burley, supra note 20, at 209-214.
18
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structural and functional elements of the distinction is the assumption that the constraint function
relies on hierarchy and centralized enforcement.

II. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STRUCTURAL/FUNCTIONAL DISTINCTION
The structural/functional distinction suffers, however, from important weaknesses. By
highlighting structural variation both within international politics and across domestic polities,
recent international relations scholarship has challenged the domestic-international dichotomy
upon which the structural/functional distinction is based. Moreover, conceptually disaggregating
the state suggests that contrary to the traditional distinction, important areas of domestic and
international public law are in fact structurally similar. Finally, the assumption that hierarchy
and centralized enforcement are necessary for public law to perform a constraint function is
problematic.

A.

Polyarchy in Domestic and International Politics

The structural/functional distinction between domestic and international public law is
based on a dichotomy between domestic and international politics that was once widely accepted
by international relations theorists. In his influential Theory of International Politics, Kenneth
Waltz states that “domestic political structure has to be examined in order to draw a distinction
between expectations about behavior and outcomes in the internal and external realms.”23 More
specifically, he argues that domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic, and the international
systems are decentralized and anarchic.24
However, recent international relations scholarship has challenged the Waltzian
dichotomy by highlighting structural variations both within international politics and across
domestic political systems. First, critics show that hierarchy and centralization in international
politics vary, among other things, by issue area, time, and groups of countries. In other words,
international politics is not uniformly or intrinsically anarchical and decentralized. For example,
international relations theorist Helen Milner asks, “Where along the continuum [between
hierarchy and anarchy] does the international system fit? The answer to this depends on two
factors: what issue we are discussing (e.g., fishing rights, the use of nuclear weapons, or control
of the seas) and what time period we have in mind.”25 Today, for example, economic relations
among European Union members exhibit a considerable degree of hierarchy and centralization.
Second, critics show that domestic politics is not uniformly or intrinsically hierarchical
and centralized. According to Milner, a view of domestic politics as hierarchic “is hard to
maintain. Who is the highest authority in the US? The people, the states, the Constitution, the
executive, the Supreme Court, or even Congress. De jure, the Constitution is; but, de facto, it
23

KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 81 (1979).
Id. at 88. In addition to structural realists like Waltz, neoliberal institutionalism generally assumes this distinction.
See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY 62 (1984) [hereinafter KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY]. It is
important to note that the term “anarchy” as used by international relations theorists generally has a strictly
structural meaning, and does not suggest a necessary lack of political order or stability.
25
Helen Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique, 17 REV. INT’L STUD. 67,
76 (1991).
24
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depends upon the issue. . . . Authority in some states may be fairly centralized, while in others it
is highly decentralized, as in the debate over ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states. But the central point is
that states exhibit a very broad range of values along this continuum, and not all of them—or
perhaps [not] even the majority—may be more centralized than the international system.”26
Milner therefore advocates a more general understanding of politics: “Domestic politics,
and I would argue international politics as well, varies along a continuum from hierarchy to
anarchy, with most politics resembling polyarchy, which lies in between these extremes.”27 In
contrast to the traditional structural/functional distinction based on the Waltzian dichotomy,
which treats the structural differences between domestic and international public law as intrinsic
and categorical, Milner’s continuum implies that those differences are of degree, not kind, and
that they depend on a variety of factors other than whether a system of public law is domestic or
international.

B.

Disaggregating the Concept of the State

I propose a further, related critique that is of particular relevance to the question of public
law. A strict domestic-international dichotomy suggests that hierarchy and centralization is
uniform not only across domestic polities but also within them, that is, that all aspects of
domestic politics are hierarchic and centralized. However, conceptually disaggregating the state
in order to consider the relationships among its internal parts reveals important aspects of
domestic politics that are structurally anarchic and decentralized.
Consider, for example, the relationships between coequal branches of government. These
relationships are structurally anarchic and decentralized. There is, for example, no sovereign that
sits above the judicial, legislative and executive branches of the United States government, and
therefore no central enforcer of the constitutional rules that govern their relationships with each
26

Id. Similarly, Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet point out that
Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia are hardly states at all, in the Waltzian sense of being centralized; while
in the international system there exist zones constituted by highly institutionalized modes of governance.
Further, national politicians, interacting in domestic political contexts, can be more jealous of their
prerogatives than statesmen negotiating with one another on the global stage; and supranational courts can be
more effective on a day-to-day basis than many national jurisdictions.
Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, supra note 11, at 267. In mid-2004, for example, the European Union and World Trade
Organization are arguably more hierarchic and centralized than the government of Haiti.
27
Milner, supra note 25, at 774. See also Alec Stone, What Is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in
International Relations Theory, 56 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 441, 469-470 (1994) (rejecting the fundamental
distinction between domestic and international society and arguing that “the supposed contrast between ‘law and
order’ domestic society and ‘anarchic’ international society is a caricature”); David A. Lake, Anarchy, Hierarchy,
and the Variety of International Relations, 50 INT’L ORG. 1, 6-8 (1996) (arguing that international security
relationships vary on a continuum ranging from anarchy to hierarchy but, citing Waltz, agreeing that as a whole “the
international system remains anarchic”); G. John Ikenberry, Constitutional Politics in International Relations, 4
EUR. J. INT’L REL. 147, 147-150 (1998) (calling the hierarchy-anarchy distinction “deeply flawed” as part of his
argument for the importance of constitutional orders in world politics). Interestingly, classical realists who preceded
Waltz seemed to recognize the fundamental similarities of domestic and international politics, even though they
foreshadowed the structural distinction that would become a central assumption of structural or “neo” realism. See,
e.g., MORGENTHAU, supra note 16, at 37 (“The essence of international politics is identical with its domestic
counterpart. Both domestic and international politics are a struggle for power, modified only by the different
conditions under which this struggle takes place in the domestic and international spheres”).
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other. Similarly, there is no hierarchically superior entity above the federal government that
centrally enforces the constitutional rules that prescribe limits on its power vis à vis the states
and individual citizens. For example, to what centralized enforcement mechanism can states
look for protection against encroachments by the federal government on powers reserved to the
states by the Tenth Amendment? The Supreme Court itself has narrowly interpreted the
amendment, calling it a mere “truism.”28 Even if the Supreme Court more expansively
interpreted the Tenth Amendment, there would be no higher sovereign to enforce the court’s
decisions against an offending branch of the federal government.
The point is that contrary to the assumptions of the structural/functional distinction, some
of the most important areas of domestic public law—including constitutional rules governing
separation of powers, federalism, and civil liberties—are structurally anarchic and decentralized,
and in that sense structurally similar to important areas of international public law.29

C

Structure and Constraint

By assuming that hierarchy and centralized enforcement is necessary for public law to
systematically constrain behavior, the traditional distinction also suffers from a theoretical
limitation. Other legal and political science scholars have already argued against this
assumption, showing that there are other important causal mechanisms that explain how public
law can constrain behavior, and that in any event, centralized enforcement is not as effective as
commonly supposed.30 Therefore, I will simply attempt to illustrate this problem as it applies to
public law.
As discussed above, by conceptually disaggregating the state and considering the
governmental relationships that are internal to domestic political systems, one observes that
important aspects of domestic public law, including rules governing relationships among coequal
branches of government and limiting government powers vis à vis the states and individuals, are
not centrally enforced. Yet it is widely understood that constitutional rules regarding separation
of powers, federalism, and individual liberties do constrain government behavior. Thus, a puzzle
is posed for adherents to the structural/functional distinction. How can public law constrain
government behavior in the absence of hierarchy and centralized enforcement?
The existence of a constitutional court is not an entirely satisfactory answer. For
example, the United States Supreme Court, having established itself as the ultimate interpreter of
28

United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
Consistent with this analysis, John Brehm discusses “inter-state” compliance issues or “compliance problems that
arise between political units” as encompassing both compliance problems in international relations and compliance
problems among branches of domestic government. John Brehm, Steps Toward a Political Science of Compliance:
Common Insights and Recurring Problems 8-10 (Apr. 9, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://polmeth.wustl.edu/papers/96/comply.pdf).
30
See, e.g., Carter & Trimble, supra note 11, at 8 (“[T]he emphasis on courts and a police force is misleading. Law
derives its force from sources other than those two institutions”); Brehm, supra note 29, at 12 (arguing that sanctions
are “gross[ly] inefficien[t]” and “rarely more effective than educational or exhortatory forms of supervision”); JOHN
BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE, ch. 2 (1997) (explaining why supervision of
bureaucracies fails to induce compliance); and TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, ch. 1 (1990) (advancing a
normative theory of compliance that does not rely on punishment).
29
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federal law, may take cases involving public law issues and declare a governmental entity to be
in violation, but it has no independent power to enforce its decisions.31 Nor is there any higher
power to compel the Supreme Court to take such cases and make decisions in accordance with
the law. The typical case reaches the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari, acceptance of which
is entirely at the Court’s discretion and which is, given the number of petitions filed yearly, an
extremely high hurdle.32 Likewise, treating the central government as a unitary actor that acts as
a single unit to enforce public law against states, government officials, or other branches of
government fails to provide a satisfactory solution to this puzzle. Such unified action cannot be
assumed, as it involves collective action problems that are not always easily solved, particularly
since different branches of government often have different interests and political agendas.33
My point, of course, is not that domestic public law is ineffective. Nor am I suggesting
that centralized enforcement is unimportant. Rather, my claim is that structural differences
between domestic and international public law are differences of degree, not kind. Moreover,
contrary to what is assumed by the structural/functional distinction, public law can constrain
government behavior even in the absence of hierarchy and centralized enforcement, and the
conditions under which this might be possible do not depend on intrinsic differences between the
domestic and international realms.

31

For example, in the 1832 case of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), the state of Georgia arrested and
convicted two missionaries in Cherokee territory for violating a Georgia state law requiring them to have a license
from the governor. The Supreme Court, holding that Georgia had no authority to apply its laws in Cherokee
territory, reversed the conviction. Georgia, failing to comply, refused to release the missionaries, and the federal
government, under President Andrew Jackson, who was no sympathizer with the Cherokees, did not enforce the
court’s decision. Jackson may not have actually said, “John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce
it.” But he did comment in correspondence that the “the decision of the supreme court has fell still born and they
find it cannot coerce Georgia to yield to its mandate.” Keith E. Whittington, The Construction of Constitutional
Regimes 48 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~kewhitt/chapter_two.pdf). Similarly,
after the Supreme Court’s desegregation ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Arkansas
governor Orval Faubus sent the state’s national guard to keep black students from entering Little Rock’s Central
High School. President Eisenhower then federalized the guard and sent federal troops to patrol the high school, and
in September 1957 black students, under military escort, were able to enter. But by September 1958, Faubus had
managed to shut down Little Rock’s public high schools rather than comply with the desegregation ruling. Only in
August 1959, after a recall election that resulted in the removal of three segregationists from the school board, were
the high schools reopened and a plan for desegregation put into place. PAUL S. BOYER ET AL., THE ENDURING
VISION 933-934 (1996). See also Little Rock Central High 40th Anniversary Home Page at
http://www.centralhigh57.org/index.html.
32
JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (1986).
33
For example, impeaching and convicting a United States president in order to remove him from office requires
collective action by the House of Representatives and the Senate and, nominally, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court (see U.S. CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 2 and § 3, and art. II, § 4), and imposition of sanctions against a state
requires collective action by the federal judicial and executive branches. To return to the two examples supra in
note 31, collective action did yield an attempt to enforce the Supreme Court’s desegregation ruling in Brown v.
Board of Education by sending federal troops to Arkansas, but this was insufficient; local political developments
were necessary to secure compliance. And resistance by the executive branch prevented collective action to enforce
the Court’s decision in Worcester v. Georgia. Conceptually, collective action problems among coequal branches of
government are not entirely unlike the collective action problems faced by nation-states attempting to act together to
provide for decentralized enforcement in international law. On the concept of decentralized enforcement in
international relations, see, for example, KEOHANE, supra note 24, at 103 and George W. Downs et al., Is the Good
News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation? 50 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 379, 387 (1996).
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D.

Assessing the Significance of the Objections

In summary, I have attempted to demonstrate the limitations of the traditional
structural/functional distinction by highlighting structural variations both within international
politics and across domestic political systems, by conceptually disaggregating the state, and by
challenging the assumption that hierarchy and centralized enforcement is necessary for public
law to constrain government behavior. However, all useful theories must make simplifying
assumptions. The question is whether, when applied to the study of public law, the theoretical
advantages of the assumptions embodied in the structural/functional distinction outweigh their
disadvantages.34
I suggest that the answer is no, because the traditional distinction obscures variables and
causal mechanisms that do not depend on their domestic or international status, yet nevertheless
may help explain how public law influences government behavior. It is necessary to understand
more than levels of hierarchy and centralized enforcement to understand the functions of public
law. To state the problem more formally, if the dependent variable is the extent to which public
law influences government behavior, theories based on the structural/functional distinction rely
on two explanatory variables, hierarchy and centralization, which in turn depend on whether the
context is domestic or international (in essence, a domestic-international “dummy” variable).
Such theories, although having the advantage of parsimony, thus exclude other potentially
important variables and causal mechanisms that may provide better explanations for variations in
public law’s influence, regardless of whether the context is domestic or international.

III. THEORETICAL CONVERGENCE IN DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW
But merely discarding the structural/functional distinction will not get us very far. The
traditional approach may obscure important variables, but one cannot study every variable and
consider every type of variation. If one sets aside the traditional structural/functional distinction,
one needs to find alternative roadmaps for identifying which variables and which causal
mechanisms to examine. As I demonstrate below, there are a variety of rational choice oriented
theories separately advanced by scholars of domestic law and scholars of international law that
might serve this purpose.35

34

Waltz is, of course, well aware that his dichotomy does not perfectly reflect empirical reality. However, he makes
an explicit tradeoff hoping for increased theoretical power: “Increasing the number of categories would bring the
classification of societies closer to reality. But that would be to move away from a theory claiming explanatory
power to a less theoretical system promising greater descriptive accuracy.” WALTZ, supra note 23, at 115. See
generally id. chap. 5 for a thorough discussion of Waltz’s understanding of real-world deviations from his
simplifying assumptions.
35
The theories discussed in this section are intended to illustrate theoretical convergence across the domesticinternational divide, and to suggest that the causal mechanisms through which public law influences government
behavior may be similar in the domestic and international realms. This article does not attempt to exhaustively
survey critiques of these approaches or to empirically evaluate their validity. For a general critique of rational
choice applications in political science, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY (1994). Nor is the focus on the theories in this section meant to imply that there are not other potentially
fruitful rational choice approaches to understanding public law, or that approaches from outside the rationalist
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These scholars, from different sides of the domestic-international divide, and from both
law and political science, are asking essentially the same question: how can public law constrain
government behavior in the absence of hierarchy and centralized enforcement?36 And,
importantly, they are giving similar answers suggesting similar causal mechanisms, four of
which I will discuss below: reputation and credibility, focal points and coordination, issue
breadth and time horizon in interest calculations, and norms and domestic politics. Thus, there is
an emerging common language, inchoate as it may presently be, for a unified approach to the
study of domestic and international public law.37 This theoretical convergence is important not
only for its implications for the future of interdisciplinary scholarship in law and politics, but

tradition cannot also contribute to a unified understanding of public law. For a leading constructivist’s treatment of
law, see KRATOCHWIL, supra note 3.
36
For example, international legal scholar Thomas Franck posed his central question as “Why do powerful nations
obey powerless rules?” THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990). Similarly,
Stephen Holmes, a scholar of domestic law and politics, frames the issue like this: “[W]hy do people with power
accept limits to their power? . . . [W]hy do people with guns obey people without guns?” Stephen Holmes, Lineages
of the Rule of Law, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 19, 24 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds.,
2003). The same question drives the recent volume edited by comparative political scientists José María Maravall
and Adam Przeworski on rule of law, José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski, Introduction, in DEMOCRACY AND
THE RULE OF LAW 1, 1 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003), and has long interested positive
political theorists. See, e.g., Barry Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of
Secure Markets, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECONOMICS 286 (1993) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS]; Terry
M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 213, 220 (1990). J. L. Brierly,
in his classic treatise on international law, recognized the centrality of this question in both domestic and
international politics:
The fundamental difficulty of subjecting states to the rule of law is the fact that states possess power. The
legal control of power is always difficult, and it is not only for international law that it constitutes a
problem. The domestic law of every state has the same problem, though usually (but not, as the persistence
of civil wars proves, invariably) in a form less acute. In any decently governed state domestic law can
normally deal effectively with the behavior of individuals, but that is because the individual is weak and
society is relatively strong; but when men join together in associations or factions for the achievement of
some purpose which the members have in common the problem of the law becomes more difficult.
BRIERLY, supra note 3, at 48.
37
Others have previously hinted at such a possibility. See, e.g., Milner, supra note 25, at 81; Beth A. Simmons,
International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 819, 828 n.20 (2000) [hereinafter Simmons, State Behavior]. One team of scholars has developed an
interesting theory of dispute resolution and governance that, while not specifically focused on public law, has
general applicability to domestic and international rules systems. See Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the
Construction of Governance, in ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 55 (Martin Shapiro and Alec Stone Sweet
eds., 2002); Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, supra note 11. In fact, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet seem to go further than I
do, suggesting that the concept of domestic and international rules in general, legal and non-legal, public and
private, could be unified. They “see institutions as rule structures” then “deny any inherent, theoretically significant,
distinction between how international and domestic regimes operate.” Sandholtz & Stone Sweet, supra note 11, at
240, 269. Brehm, supra note 29, suggests the possibility of a general theory of compliance, extending not only
across the domestic-international divide, but also across individual, individual-state, and inter-state relations. Even
the classic realist Edward Hallett Carr asserted in a similar vein that “the relation of law to politics will be found to
be the same in the international as in the national sphere.” EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS
1919-1939: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 172 (1964). The work of FRANCK,
supra note 36, and KRATOCHWIL, supra note 3, respectively based on factors of legitimacy and communicative
action, both of which factors arguably operate in similar ways domestically and internationally, also suggests the
possibility of a unified approach.
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also because it suggests that the causal mechanisms through which public law influences
government behavior may be similar in the domestic and international realms.38

A.

Reputation and Credibility

One causal mechanism is related to reputation and credibility. A government may
comply with domestic or international public law to enhance its reputation for law-abidingness.
Such a reputation makes a government a more attractive partner in mutually beneficial
cooperative undertakings with citizens or other governments. In contrast, a reputation for
violating public law can be costly for a government, since it may deter potential partners and
thus cause the government to forego the benefits of cooperation. With relatively little reference
to each others’ literatures, scholars of international public law and scholars of domestic public
law have separately developed similar theories using this same basic logic, representing one area
of convergence across the domestic-international divide.
According to some international relations39 and international legal40 scholars, reputation
is the central mechanism for compliance with public international law. In an early formulation
of this logic, Robert Keohane explained as follows: “[G]overnments will decide whom to make
agreements with, and on what terms, largely on the basis of their expectations about their
partners’ willingness and ability to keep their commitments. A good reputation makes it easier
for a government to enter into advantageous international agreements; tarnishing that reputation
imposes costs by making agreements more difficult to reach.”41
In what may be the most empirically rigorous work to date on compliance with
international law, Beth Simmons found governments that declared adherence to Article VIII of
the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement (which prohibits current account
restrictions) were less likely than other governments to restrict their current accounts, controlling
for regional policies, policy inertia, and a variety of macroeconomic factors that could put
pressure on a government to impose such restrictions.42 She argues that governments commit to
and comply with Article VIII “to enhance their credibility to markets that doubt their ability or
willingness to maintain current account policy liberalization into the future. Governments that
are interested in efficiency gains from international transactions have good reasons to establish
their credibility through such a commitment.”43 More generally, Simmons argues that
governments comply with legal commitments “to preserve their reputation for predictable
behavior in the protection of property rights.”44
38

See the fourth part of this article for a more thorough discussion of the implications of this convergence.
See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 20, at 81.
40
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 18611867 (2002).
41
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 24, at 105-106. In his 1968 book How Nations Behave, Louis Henkin
anticipated this type of explanation by noting that one reason governments observe international legal commitments
is that they “generally desire a reputation for principled behavior” and that their “foreign policy depends
substantially on its ‘credit’—on maintaining the expectation that it will live up to international mores and
obligations.” HENKIN, supra note 20, at 52.
42
Simmons, State Behavior, supra note 37, at 829-32.
43
Id. at 821.
44
Id. at 820.
39
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Mancur Olson has made an argument in the domestic context that is strikingly similar to
Simmons’ argument about compliance with international public law. Olson assumes that
governments are rationally self-interested in maximizing tax revenues and, therefore, in
maximizing income generated in the economy; and that an economy generates its maximum
income only if there is a high rate of investment which, in turn, requires secure property rights.
If people fear expropriation, they will invest less, and in the long run the government’s tax
collections will be reduced. For this reason, rational governments seek a reputation for
protecting private property. But a government’s promise not to expropriate property is not
credible unless it is backed by law and an independent judiciary.45
Although Olson does not expressly extend his argument this far, the implication is that a
rational government has an incentive not to violate public law (say, for example, the Fifth
Amendment’s “takings clause” which prohibits government taking of private property except for
a public purpose and with just compensation) because doing so would damage its reputation for
protecting property, and ultimately reduce its tax revenues.46 Moreover, this argument can be
extended to apply not only to security of property rights and generation of tax revenues, but also
to cooperation between a government and its subjects in general, particularly since “[e]ven the
most powerful government cannot enforce any rule it chooses,” but “must elicit compliance from
the majority of the governed.”47 According to José Maravall and Adam Przeworski, “following
Machiavelli’s advice, self-interested rulers willingly restrain themselves and make their behavior
predictable in order to obtain a sustained, voluntary cooperation of well-organized groups
commanding valuable resources.”48
Kenneth Shepsle also has argued that even though “[t]he ex ante prospect of ex post
cheating strongly qualifies the ability of agents to exhaust gains from cooperation . . . [a]ll is not
lost,” partly because in situations of repeated play the reputational mechanism can make
cooperation self-enforcing. “[I]f A develops a reputation for reneging, then even those agents
who have never been personally victimized by A will not enter into coalitions with him.”49
Similarly, David Kreps asks what is the source of faith in organizations that leads people to grant
organizations authority over them, and answers that it is reputation. “The organization, or, more
precisely, those in the organization who have decision-making authority, will have an interest in
preserving or even promoting a good reputation to allow for future beneficial transactions.”50
Even if the reputational mechanism helps explain how public law works both
domestically and internationally, it must be noted that this mechanism is far from perfect.
Shepsle notes, for example, that difficulties with “[t]he identification of cheaters, free-riding
behavior, and problems with imposing sanctions (who will do the punishing?),” as well as the
45

Mancur Olson, Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 567, 571-572 (1993).
Violating a specific public law rule like the Fifth Amendment’s taking clause may more broadly affect the
government’s reputation for abiding by property-protecting public law rules in general.
47
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 155 (1984). See also Brehm, supra note 29, at 12.
48
Maravall & Przeworski, supra note 36, at 3 (paraphrasing Stephen Holmes).
49
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Equilibria and Equilibrium Institutions, in THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51, 71
(Herbert F. Weisberg ed., 1986).
50
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
90, 92-93 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
46
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fact that “[c]heating is not dichotomous (cheat, not cheat),” can reduce the efficacy of reputation
as a form of self-enforcement.51 Similarly, as Andrew Guzman argues in the international
context, the impact of reputational concerns depends on factors including the severity of the
violation, the reasons for the violation, the extent to which other actors know of the violation,
and the clarity of the commitment and the violation.52 In some cases a government simply may
find that the benefits of violating public law may be greater than the ensuing reputational costs.
In other cases, a government may find that other types of reputations (such as for pursuing one’s
interests, helping one’s friends, punishing one’s enemies, or being tough) are more beneficial
than a reputation for law-abidingness, or it may be strong enough to extract benefits from other
actors no matter how bad its reputation for law abidingness may be.53 Finally, George Downs
and Michael Jones argue that the power of reputation to enforce compliance is usually modest
because actors “have reason to revise their estimate of a state’s reputation following a defection
or pattern of defections . . . only in connection with agreements that they believe are (1) affected
by the same or similar sources of fluctuating compliance costs (or benefits) and (2) valued the
same or less by the defecting state.”54 As a result, governments may have a variety of different
reputations related to different regimes or different commitments within a regime.55

B.

Focal Points and Coordination

Focal points are the key element of another causal mechanism for public law’s influence
that has been identified by both scholars of domestic law and scholars of international law. The
theory is that public law influences government behavior by providing focal points that are
necessary for coordinated behavior. Although focal point explanations of law vary, the basic
concept is rooted in game theory. According to the folk theorem of repeated games, there can be
many equilibria in a single game.56 When the folk theorem applies, there may be “multiple paths
toward capturing the gains from cooperation and no obvious way for a set of decentralized actors
to converge on one of them.”57 Focal points provide a solution to this problem by singling out
one coordination point and distinguishing it from others.58

51

Shepsle, supra note 49, at 72.
Guzman, supra note 40, at 1861.
53
Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487, 497498 (1997) [hereinafter Keohane, Two Optics].
54
George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95
(2002).
55
Id.
56
HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING 129 (2000).
57
Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s
Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173, 175 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
58
Thomas Schelling gave the following example in his seminal treatment of focal points:
Two people parachute unexpectedly into the area shown, each with a map [showing a river, some roads and
buildings, a pond and a bridge] and knowing the other has one, but neither knowing where the other has
dropped nor able to communicate directly. They must get together quickly to be rescued. Can they study their
maps and “coordinate” their behavior? Does the map suggest some particular meeting place so
unambiguously that each will be confident that the other reads the same suggestion with confidence?
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-55 (1980). Schelling’s answer is yes. In his unscientific
sample, almost all people playing this game, without being able to discuss the matter with each other, nevertheless
were able to coordinate by meeting at the bridge, which emerged as the natural focal point. Id. at 55-56.
52

Whytock 16
Legal rules can act as focal points by identifying which coordination points actors will
adopt. Indeed, according to Richard McAdams, legal rules may work particularly well as focal
points because they have the advantages of being highly public (“[t]he publicity frequently
accorded law means it is more likely to create the expectations necessary for coordination”) and
unique (law’s special status “causes its message to ‘stand out’ against the background of public
discourse”).60
59

There are two versions of the focal points causal mechanism, one relating to the benefits
of coordination facilitated by an existing focal point and the costs of re-coordination around a
new focal point, and another relating to the role of focal points in solving coordination problems
among prospective decentralized enforcers of public law.
According to the first approach, a public law focal point may make possible beneficial
cooperation between a government on the one hand, and its citizens, other branches of
government, governmental subunits (such as states), or foreign governments on the other hand.
A government then has three choices: it can comply with the public law focal point and continue
to benefit from the cooperation; it can violate the public law focal point and forego the benefits
of cooperation; or it can attempt to negotiate re-coordination of cooperation around a different
focal point. According to this approach, the government’s decision will depend on the benefits
of noncompliance and the costs of re-coordination, relative to the benefits of coordination around
the preexisting focal point. To the extent re-coordination is costly and cooperation is beneficial
to the government, it has an incentive to comply with the public law focal point.61
On the international side, although other scholars have recognized the focal point
function of international public law,62 one of the few systematic discussions of this function is
Geoffrey Garrett and Barry Weingast’s 1993 chapter on the European common market.
According to them, member states had powerful incentives to liberalize trade within the
European Community (EC), but since there was no single obvious path toward that goal,
members faced a formidable coordination problem. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) solved
that coordination problem in its Cassis de Dijon case by promulgating a focal point: the principle
of mutual recognition, according to which goods that have been legally produced and marketed
in one member state should have unrestricted access to other member states’ markets. The ECJ
did not force EC members to adopt and comply with this principle; rather, “the court’s decision
acted as a focal point around which EC members could coordinate their bargaining.”63
59

Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Normativity of Law, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 3, 21 (1999).
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1668 (2000).
61
These arguments may also be supported by theories of institutional path dependence. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ch. 11 (1990). The focal point
literature sometimes seems to imply an assumption that the costs of re-coordination are prohibitively high, but as
Gerard Alexander argues, it is not a safe assumption to make without careful empirical investigation. Gerard
Alexander, Power, Interests and the Causal Effects of Institutions 16-20 (March 2004) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://www.europanet.org/conference2004/papers/A2_Alexander.pdf).
62
See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 53, at 493, and Simmons, supra note 20, at 81. Robert Keohane elaborated the
basic logic for this approach in the international context, reasoning that states may comply with regime rules
because they are easier to maintain than they are to create: “In these terms, international regimes embody sunk costs,
and we can understand why they persist even when all members would prefer somewhat different mixtures of
principles, rules, and institutions.” KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY, supra note 24, at 100-103.
63
Garrett & Weingast, supra note 57, at 189. Garrett and Weingast also argue that focal points help solve the puzzle
posed by an ECJ with very limited sanctioning powers that nevertheless has been able to powerfully affect the
60
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Similarly, in the domestic context, Russell Hardin reasons that “[o]nce a coordination is
in place and people are following it, the cost of re-coordinating is the chief obstacle to moving to
any supposedly superior order. This cost can block re-coordination even if it would be in
virtually everyone’s interest to be in a new order.”64 Similarly, David Kreps links the concept of
focal points to reputational mechanisms (discussed above), thus providing another reason why it
may be in the interest of hierarchical superiors to adhere to focal point rules even when doing so
might not be efficient in the short-term.65
The second approach emphasizes the role of focal points in coordinating cooperation
among prospective decentralized enforcers of public law. According to Barry Weingast,
governments comply with limitations on their power when they believe that violating those
limitations will lead to concerted action by citizens to depose the government or withdraw
support.66 However, if the government believes that citizens are unable to act in concert to
defend their rights, those limitations will not be self-enforcing.67 Maintaining limits on
government is therefore a “massive social coordination problem.”68 Citizens must coordinate on
which limits on governmental power are to be defended and how they are defined. Otherwise,
domestic politics of EU members, who have acquiesced as the court’s power has increased. “The logic of
constructed focal points provides a simple and powerful answer,” they explain. The Treaty of Rome, which
provides the legal basis for the ECJ, is difficult to amend because of the unanimity requirement, and even if it could
be amended it is unlikely that EC members would be able to agree on an alternative arrangement. Id. at 197.
64
RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 16 (1999) (emphasis omitted). As
Hardin elaborates, “Although its rationale in part is similar, this is not the system of checks and balances envisioned
by Montesquieu. It is a finer grained application of Madison’s injunction: ‘Ambition must be made to counter
ambition’ (Federalist, 51). . . . To be sure, I block your action because I think it is wrong. But I do so with
substantial support that makes my action costless or even beneficial to me. Similarly, I do my job well because
others will generally support and reward me for working well. Moreover, it would be difficult to disrupt this system
to anyone’s benefit, including that of a national president or prime minister.” Id. at 26. But Hardin is not
completely optimistic: “Such a conventional norm system may not work equally well at all levels or in all
circumstances” and he does not claim that “such a system can never be abused for essentially self-interested
purposes.” However, “its force can be seen in recent decades in the forced removal from office of legislators, highranking bureaucrats, presidential advisers, a president, and a vice-president in the United States, and of ministers and
other high-ranking officials in Japan and several European nations, most notably Italy in recent years.” Id. at 26.
Moreover, if a constitution provides coordination on a central program, “there is much less need to have an external
force to control the government to make it comply with the constitutional order. Hence, constitutional government
is feasibly workable. It can fail, however, if the central coordination requires great power that can be used for
purposes other than managing the programme on which we have coordinated. In that case, the constitutional order
can fail utterly.” Id. at 28. Adam Przeworski makes a similar argument, although not with reference to coordination
or focal points: “[C]ompliance can be self-enforcing if the institutional framework is designed in such a way that the
state is not a third party but an agent of coalitions of political forces.” ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE
MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 25 (1991). See also
Maravall & Przeworski, supra note 36, at 11-12 (“[A] system of checks and balances leads the government as a
whole to act in ways that are predictable and moderate when (1) these institutions have means and incentives to
check one another and (2) when their institutional prerogatives are backed by support from organized interests”).
65
Kreps, supra note 50, at 124-131.
66
See Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245
(1997) [hereinafter Foundations I]; Barry R. Weingast, A Postscript to “Political Foundations of Democracy and
the Rule of Law,” in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 109 (José María Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds., 2003)
[hereinafter Foundations II].
67
Foundations I, supra note 66, at 246.
68
Id. at 261.
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collective action will be impossible.69 Constitutions can provide a focal solution to this problem
by specifying “widely accepted and unambiguous limits on the state.”70 Under these
circumstances, the rule of law will be self-enforcing, since the government factors the risk of
losing citizen support into its interest calculations. Although this second version of the focal
points theory of public law’s influence has not been as well developed in the international
context, the same logic would seem to apply: that international public law focal points can help
governments solve coordination problems associated with decentralized enforcement.71

C.

Issue Breadth and Time Horizon in Interest Calculations

A third area of theoretical convergence across the domestic-international divide involves
the relationship between public law and the definition of issue breadth and time horizon in
governments’ interest calculations.72 When governments consider violating a public law rule in
isolation from other issues and only in terms of short-term consequences, compliance is less
likely than when the violation is weighed in light of other issues and in terms of long-term
implications. Theories of domestic and international institutions suggest that systems of public
law can make the long-term interest calculation, and hence compliance, more likely.
In the international context, Robert Keohane argues that institutions can help solve the
problem of “myopically” defined interests:
The puzzle of compliance is why governments, seeking to promote their own interests,
ever comply with the rules of international regimes when they view these rules as in
conflict with what I will call their ‘myopic self-interest.’ Myopic self-interest refers to
governments’ perception of the relative costs and benefits to them of alternative courses
of action with regard to a particular issue, when that issue is considered in isolation from
others. An action is in a government’s myopic self-interest if it has the highest expected
value of any alternative, apart from the indirect effects that actions on the specific issue in
question would have on other issues. . . . [However,] [t]his begs the question of whether
the national interest is defined myopically, without regard to the effects of one’s actions
on other issues or other values, or in a more farsighted way, taking into account the
impact of violating international rules and norms on other state objectives. . . . [T]he
crucial issues are precisely those of how interests are defined, and how institutions affect
states’ definitions of their interests.73
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Foundations II, supra note 66, at 111. Moreover, absent an effective focal point, a government may attempt to
“divide and conquer” citizens by co-opting certain groups to form coalitions against others, thereby blunting citizen
attempts to enforce compliance. Id.
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Foundations I, supra note 66, at 261.
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For example, “[i]ndividuals and groups can zero in on international court decisions as focal points around which
to mobilize, creating . . . [an] intersection between transnational litigation and democratic politics.” Robert O.
Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational,
54 INT’L ORG. 457, 478 (2000). See also discussion infra Part III.D.
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Precommitment theory, which is based on a similar concept—foresight—has been used to explain why
governments would bind themselves to legal rules in the first place. A 2003 symposium published by the Texas
Law Review includes discussions of precommitment theory’s applicability to both constitutional law, see, e.g., Jon
Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2003); John Ferejohn & Lawrence
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Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2055 (2003).
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One way that institutions can affect these definitions is by linking the issue that is being
myopically contemplated by a government to other issues that are covered by the institution, and
by connecting the immediate costs or benefits of violating a rule related to that issue to the future
costs and benefits of the overall institution.74 Similarly, a government that finds the overall
system of international public law to be in its long-term interests may be less likely to violate
specific rules of public international law. In other words, a government may forego an
immediate advantage from violation because it has an even greater interest in maintaining the
overall system.75
Adam Przeworski has made a similar argument about public law in the domestic context.
According to him:
Democratic institutions render an intertemporal character to political conflicts. They
offer a long time horizon to political actors; they allow them to think about the future
rather than being concerned exclusively with present outcomes. . . . Some institutions
under certain conditions offer the relevant political forces a prospect of eventually
advancing their interests that is sufficient to incite them to comply with immediately
unfavorable outcomes. Political forces comply with present defeats because they believe
that the institutional framework that organizes the democratic competition will permit
them to advance their interests in the future.76
Thus, “losers may comply not because they recognize the decision as legal or just but only
because they do not want to threaten the institutions.”77 Under these circumstances, compliance
may constitute “the equilibrium of the decentralized strategies of all relevant political forces,”
making compliance self-enforcing, and eliminating the need for third party enforcement, or the
normative pull of rules, to explain compliance.78

D.

Norms and Domestic Politics

Theorizing by both scholars of domestic public law and scholars of international public
law suggests that public law’s influence on government behavior may also be explained by
domestic political factors and by understanding public law as norms.79 This represents a fourth
area of convergence across the domestic-international divide.
74
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PRZEWORSKI, supra note 64, at 19.
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78
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A norm may be understood as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.” Martha
Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 887, 891 (1998). Rules of public law may therefore be understood as norms: they provide standards
of appropriate behavior for governments whether in domestic politics (domestic public law) or international politics
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Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide, 3 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 473, 475 (1997). According
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The most direct and explicit manner in which domestic and international public law work
the same way is when international law is internalized into a domestic legal system. For
example, international agreements may be enforced by domestic courts when they are selfexecuting or when they are incorporated into domestic law through implementing legislation.80
Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik and Anne-Marie Slaughter have hypothesized that “[o]ther
things being equal, the more firmly embedded an international commitment is in domestic law,
the more likely is compliance with judgments to enforce it,” especially in liberal democracies
which are “particularly respectful of the rule of law and most open to individual access to
judicial systems.”81 When international law has been internalized, “[g]overnments that do not
comply face a new calculus: in addition to the international costs of breaching a legalized
commitment, they must now face the much more serious reputational and political costs of
breaching legal commitments before their own citizens.”82
Even if an international legal norm has not been internalized into the domestic legal
system, individuals and groups may still use it to exert political pressure on governments—just
as they use domestic norms to do so. “An opposition party, an independent and ubiquitous press,
a scholarly community, various pressure groups—all vigilant to criticize the government—will .
. . seize on violations of international law, particularly those of political import.”83 In effect,
such groups can translate international public law into domestic political pressure through
lobbying and mobilization techniques that are well known to students of domestic politics.84 The
basic logic is that domestic groups whose interests would be served by compliance will organize
to influence the government in favor of compliance.85 Thus, “[l]egalization has its principal
effect on compliance and international cooperation through the mobilization of individuals and
groups in domestic politics” referred to as “compliance constituencies.”86 This political
called logics of appropriateness, derived from social norms. . . . [N]orms are constituting actor identity/interests, and
not just constraining behavior.” Id.
80
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 533 (1995). But
this cannot be taken for granted. In addition to the raging academic debate about whether or not international law
should be applied by domestic courts (see above), courts themselves vary in their willingness to apply international
legal norms.
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2599 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1998).
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Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
661, 675 (2000).
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HENKIN, supra note 20, at 64.
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Finnemore and Sikkink use a similar concept of “norm entrepreneurs” and argue that they are strategic political
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normative commitments of the norm entrepreneurs.” Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 79, at 910.
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Conversely, it should be noted, domestic groups whose interests would be served by noncompliance will lobby the
government for noncompliance. Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L
ORG. 385, 398 (2000).
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Id. at 397-98. Louis Henkin made a similar argument some time ago: “Some international arrangements also
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mechanism works in essentially the same way for domestic public law norms and international
public law norms.87
Norm-oriented theories of public law have also been developed outside the rational
choice tradition. For example, both domestic and international public law may derive normative
force from legitimacy. In the international context, Thomas Franck has developed a theory of
legitimacy according to which governments may obey a rule of international public law
“[b]ecause they perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of
legitimacy. In this hypothesis, legitimacy is assigned the role of an independent variable, one
which controls the extent to which a rule is perceived to exert a powerful pull toward compliance
on those to whom it is addressed.”88 In the domestic context, Tom Tyler finds that the law’s
legitimacy has an independent effect on compliance by individuals.89 Other scholars using
normative theories to explain the influence of law on individual behavior include Lawrence
Lessig and Cass Sunstein and, as Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink note, “[t]he processes
through which [domestic legal scholars such as Sunstein and Lessig] claim that norms work
domestically—involving norm entrepreneurs, imitation, ‘norms cascades,’ and ‘norm
bandwagons’—are entirely consistent with the research done on norms by [international
relations] scholars.” 90
There may also be psychological explanations for compliance with public law norms. In
the domestic context, John Brehm argues that such psychological explanations for compliance
may include the drive to maintain behavioral consistency, obedience to authority, and social
proof.91 In the international context, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the importance of selfesteem and conformity for individuals provides the psychological “microfoundations” for the
influence of norms on government behavior. While they acknowledge that it is difficult to
87

Theoretical claims about how domestic public law and international public law are used strategically are
consistent with legal practice. Public law litigation has been well documented with similar aims and using similar
strategies based on domestic public law, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976), and international public law, see Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law
Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991). Similarly, human rights lawyers use “impact or test litigation, advice,
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TYLER, supra note 30, at 58-59.
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Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 79, at 893. See also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE ch. 2 (1997). There does not
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generalize to the government level from psychological research done at the individual level, they
argue that “norm entrepreneurs frequently target individual state leaders for criticism. Because
much norm advocacy involves pointing to discrepancies between words and actions and holding
actors personally responsible for adverse consequences of their actions, one way to think about
norm entrepreneurs is that they provide the information and publicity that provoke cognitive
dissonance among norm violators.”92

IV. A UNIFIED CONCEPT OF PUBLIC LAW AND ITS ADVANTAGES
Because of the limitations of the traditional structural/functional distinction, and in light
of the considerable theoretical convergence across domestic public law and international public
law scholarship, public law scholars in both law schools and political science departments should
begin systematically thinking beyond the domestic-international divide.93 To support such
thinking, I propose a unified concept of public law as an alternative to the traditional
structural/functional distinction.
The unified approach has four primary characteristics. First, the unified concept is based
on a basic understanding of domestic and international public law as law that prescribes
appropriate government behavior.94 This prescriptive function is a fundamental similarity
between domestic and international public law, and one of the principal reasons for studying the
two realms of public law as like phenomena.
Second, the unified concept, unlike the traditional distinction, recognizes the possibility
of structural and other similarities between different areas of domestic and international public
law. There are areas of both domestic and international public law that are relatively hierarchic
and centralized, and there are areas of both domestic and international public law that are
relatively anarchic and decentralized. As Milner argues, most domestic and international politics
are polyarchic, and both vary along the same hierarchy-anarchy continuum.95
Third, the unified concept, while not denying the importance of hierarchy and centralized
enforcement, does not assume that these features are necessarily essential for public law to
constrain government behavior. Unlike the traditional approach, it takes seriously the possibility
that other causal mechanisms may allow public law to perform a constraint function, and it looks
to areas of theoretical convergence across the domestic-international divide for clues about what
those causal mechanisms may be.
Fourth, the unified concept does not assume that the variables relevant to an
understanding of public law’s influence on government behavior are different, or that they
necessarily have different values, depending on whether the context is domestic or international.
92
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To the contrary, the unified concept supposes that the variables and causal mechanisms that
explain variations in public law’s influence on government behavior may be similar in the
domestic and international spheres, as suggested by the survey of rational choice oriented
theories in the third part of this article.96
There are certainly differences between domestic and international public law, and to the
extent those differences both help explain the influence of public law on government behavior
and are intrinsic to domestic or international politics, the unified concept is, like the traditional
distinction, flawed. If the problem with the traditional distinction is that it glosses over
important similarities between domestic and international public law, the risk of the unified
concept is that it may neglect significant differences.97 Therefore, one should proceed
cautiously, keeping in mind that only further theoretical and empirical work will determine
whether scholarship based on a unified concept of public law can be productive in ways that
scholarship based solely on the traditional structural/functional distinction cannot. With these
cautions in mind, I argue that public law scholars should proceed to explore the potential, as well
as the limits, of a unified concept of public law, and that doing so may yield important
theoretical, pedagogical and policy benefits.

A.

Theoretical Advantages

A unified concept of public law can support thinking across the domestic-international
divide by focusing efforts to build upon and formalize the considerable areas of theoretical
convergence between domestic public law and international public law scholarship. This, in
turn, has the potential of leading to a general theoretical approach that uses a common set of
variables and causal mechanisms to explain variations in public law’s influence regardless of
whether the context is domestic or international.98
One specific area of public law studies for which a unified concept has implications is
compliance studies.99 As Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter argue, the study of
compliance is a central issue in international relations theory:
96

To reiterate, my focus on rational choice oriented theories is not meant to imply that other approaches are unlikely
to be useful. To the contrary, I believe that a similar review of constructivist theories may reveal additional, perhaps
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[It] implicitly examines the foundations of international institutions and of international
order. If compliance with international rules is ephemeral, or results purely from the
exercise of power and coercion, the ability of international law and institutions to order
world politics is greatly limited. Conversely, if compliance is empirically demonstrable,
theoretically understandable and prescriptively manageable, then the case for the role of
international law and institutions in achieving global order is strong. IR [international
relations] and IL [international law] scholars have a joint agenda in compliance research,
an issue that now lies at the heart of international relations theory.100
A unified concept of public law suggests that compliance is as important an issue for scholars of
domestic politics as Raustiala and Slaughter claim it is for international relations scholars.
Moreover, a unified concept might help scholars move toward a “synthesis of compliance as a
problem that cuts across multiple levels,” both domestic and international, as called for by John
Brehm.101
A unified concept of public law also has heuristic and interdisciplinary implications. As
Helen Milner has argued, one problem with the view that international relations is unique is that
“one is less likely to use the hypotheses, concepts, and questions about politics developed
elsewhere. International politics must then reinvent the wheel, not being able to draw on other
political science scholarship. The radical dichotomy between international and domestic politics
seems to represent a conceptual and theoretical step backwards. . . . Conceptions unifying, and
not separating, these two arenas are heuristically fruitful.”102 Likewise, a unified concept of
public law can help facilitate and structure interdisciplinary dialog between legal scholars and
political scientists, and between public law scholars in both disciplines with a domestic
(American or comparative) focus and those with an international focus. The sustained efforts of
Anne-Marie Slaughter helped transform the study of international law by bringing international
relations theorists and international legal scholars together as part of a “dual agenda.”103 A
unified concept of public law suggests that scholars of domestic law and politics have an equally
important role to play in this interdisciplinary dialog.
A unified concept also has theoretical implications for the interpretation of various
empirical claims about public law’s influence. As noted in the introduction to this article, I have
not made any empirical claims about the efficacy of public law. However, few observers would
disagree with the proposition that the efficacy of public law varies substantially across domestic
polities, within domestic polities, and within the international system. Since the traditional
structural/functional distinction relies on explanatory factors that it assumes are intrinsic to either
domestic or international politics, it has difficulty explaining these variations. The unified
as “correspondence of behavior with legal rules.” Id. at 346. See also Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in
International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 387 (2000) (distinguishing effectiveness from
compliance) and Koh, supra note 81, at 2600-2601 n.3 (distinguishing obedience from compliance).
100
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101
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Milner, Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International, American, and Comparative Politics, 52
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concept, on the other hand, has the advantage of accommodating theoretical approaches, such as
those reviewed in the third part of this article, that do not rely on intrinsically domestic or
international explanatory factors and which therefore may be able to offer coherent explanations
for these variations.
More specifically, I have not made any empirical claims about the relative efficacy of
domestic and international public law.104 Yet many observers would assert that on average,
domestic public law systems (at least in well-established democracies) are more effective than
the international legal system taken as a whole. The traditional approach would attribute
international public law’s allegedly inferior efficacy to a lack of hierarchy and centralized
enforcement. A unified concept, on the other hand, would look beyond these structural
considerations and consider other variables that do not necessarily have intrinsically different
values in the domestic and international realms.105
Finally, few observers would deny that there are at least some areas of international
public law that appear to influence government behavior more systematically than some areas of
public law in certain domestic systems. Moreover, as illustrated in the second part of this article,
there are important areas of domestic public law that lack hierarchy and centralized enforcement
but nevertheless appear to constrain government behavior. These kinds of cases are anomalous
for the traditional approach. With its assumptions that there can be structural similarities
between areas of domestic and international public law and that there may be causal mechanisms
other than centralized enforcement that operate similarly in both the domestic and international
spheres, the unified concept has the potential to make sense of such cases.

B.

Pedagogical Advantages

The unified concept of public law also has pedagogical implications. For example, some
faculties may find it worthwhile to supplement dedicated constitutional law, administrative law
and international law courses with one or more integrated public law courses.106 If, as I suggest,
104
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domestic and international public law work in similar ways, then those interested in studying and
teaching how either of these realms of public law work would benefit from studying and
teaching them together. Indeed, the legal regulation of certain areas of government activity, such
as the treatment of individuals (implicating both constitutional civil rights and international
human rights) and the use of military force (implicating both constitutional foreign relations law
and international law governing the use of force), are already difficult to teach without
incorporating both domestic and international public law.
In particular, the unified approach may provide a valuable conceptual foundation for law
school courses aimed at training aspiring lawyers to develop and implement coherent legal
strategies using both domestic and international legal rules and both domestic and international
legal forums. This type of training would seem especially valuable for students interested in
engaging in what Harold Koh refers to as “transnational public law litigation.”107 Practical
training in human rights advocacy already often incorporates both domestic and international
legal strategies, thus implicitly taking a unified approach.108

C.

Policy Advantages: Institutional Design and the Fundamental Problem of
Governance

Policy-oriented legal and political science scholars may also benefit from an exploration
of a unified concept of public law. In both domestic and world politics, institutions, including
states, branches of domestic government, and international organizations, have power that allows
them to provide public goods. However, “any concentration of power carries immediately the
danger of arbitrariness, of abuse, corruption and advancing self-interest by those in control.”109
The problem, which might be called the “fundamental problem of governance,” is how to design
institutions that are able to provide essential public goods, but whose potential for abusing their
power is minimized.110
Public law, which prescribes appropriate government behavior, is one way of trying to
mitigate the fundamental problem of governance. However, since this problem transcends the
behavior. For an overview of Georgetown’s “curriculum B,” see
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/curriculum/jdprog.cfm#First.
107
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(“the threat of the autonomization of the state is perpetual and . . . institutional frameworks for controlling state
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domestic-international distinction, designing appropriate public law systems to mitigate this
problem is an endeavor that should involve some level of collaboration among scholars and
policymakers focusing on its domestic manifestations and those focusing on its international
manifestations. Area expertise is important, and each governance problem has its unique
characteristics. But those involved in efforts to design constitutions,111 to improve administrative
law,112 and to design accountable international institutions,113 would benefit from the structured
dialog, focused on sharing and collaborating on data, methods, theory and experience, that a well
developed unified concept of public law could facilitate.114
Finally, a unified concept implies a more useful and diverse policy “toolbox.” The
traditional structural/functional distinction suggests that the only way that public law can help
mitigate the fundamental problem of governance is in a hierarchical setting with centralized
enforcement; otherwise, public law is unlikely to be a significant constraint on government
behavior. This poses two problems, however. First, it may not be desirable or practicable in
certain situations to establish a hierarchical and centralized framework. Second, even if such a
framework were established, the new enforcement institution would itself have to be constrained.
In contrast, a unified concept of public law draws attention to solutions that do not necessarily
rely on hierarchy and centralized enforcement. Exactly which policy tools are appropriate
depends on the specific situation, but they are not necessarily limited to creating hierarchical
structures and systems of centralized enforcement, and they do not necessarily depend on
whether the context is domestic or international.

V. CONCLUSION
The separate study of domestic and international public law is highly institutionalized in
both law and political science. A principal theoretical justification for this separate treatment has
been the traditional structural/functional distinction. However, as I have attempted to
demonstrate, the distinction is flawed. It exaggerates the differences between the two realms of
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A Resource for Global Administrative Law? (Jan. 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/kingsburyb/sring04/globalization/stewart_012604.pdf). As John Ikenberry argues:
Both domestic and international order can take many different forms. In some countries, politics can be
extremely ruthless and coercive, while some areas of international politics are remarkably consensual and
institutionalized. Indeed, the most useful insight might be that both realms of politics—domestic and
international—face similar problems in the creation and maintenance of order, and the solutions that emerge
are also often quite similar.
Ikenberry, supra note 27, at 148. For a critique of efforts to design international accountability mechanisms based
on analogies to domestic democratic accountability see Grant & Keohane, supra note 7.
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public law, obscures theoretically relevant similarities, and has difficulty explaining the
influence of public law in the absence of hierarchy and centralized enforcement.
Therefore, public law scholars in both law and political science should think beyond the
domestic-international divide. A unified concept of public law can support this type of thinking,
and facilitate efforts to build upon and formalize the considerable areas of theoretical
convergence between domestic public law scholarship and international public law scholarship.
Perhaps most importantly, a unified concept can help policymakers and scholars of domestic and
international public law benefit from each others’ theories, data, methods and experiences as
they jointly address the important issues of law and governance that confront our world today.

